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Abstract
Political act of aggression has been growing especially in Middle-Eastern countries. Psychology has always been 
presented the dominant explanation for acts of aggression, yet, seeing the analysis of different regimes, it has not 
addressed political aggression. This paper is an attempt to explain coercion and political act of aggression. It is designed 
as an interdisciplinary study of politics, psychology and philosophy, uses rational-normative principles to conduct a 
behavioral-political analysis of acts of aggression based on the disciplinarily grounds in philosophical reasoning and 
is of explanatory nature. It is accompanied by the new terminologies: an Anxiety-Aggression-Hypothesis and a Theory 
of Political Consciousness. Moreover, these two new concepts will be assessed with rational-normative principles and 
moral significance to demonstrate the validity of three dimensions of legitimized political powers and political acts. 
Later, political anxiety will be introduced as one of the factors that can be affected by the level of political consciousness 
and level of rational-normative principles in a power relation or in an act,that consequently shows one of the origins 
of state’s coercion, the illegitimate act of aggression. 
Keywords: Aggression; Legitimacy; Anxiety; Human rights; Political 
consciousness; Rational-normative principles
Introduction
Political theories and ideologies are arguably the foundations of 
political power relations [1], the process of exercise of power between 
an authority and subject. Because different political theories apply 
contrary principles, the legitimacy of political actions, as judged 
by their norms and effectiveness [2], is an on-going and contentious 
discussion. The use of different principles leads to different practical 
exercises such as, acquisition, procedures and the practice of political 
power. For instance, western political theories take for granted that 
political legitimacy is based on the principles of human rights, the 
concept of ‘power to’ viz. the mutual appreciation of rights, and the 
rights of citizens and governments which is the concept of ‘power of ’, 
viz. the moral significance of claiming to a right. Such principles in non-
western power relations are not fully appreciate, thus the sovereignty 
relying merely on one concept of power: the concept of ‘power over’ 
which implies domination. The western principles for a legitimate 
power relation is not only vital for current political relations, including 
the ability to secure and to develop peace, but also to recognize and 
address the illegitimate state and their instruments. Given this premise, 
we can normatively and empirically assess ‘political acts of aggression’, 
or state’s coercion which are arguably an instrument of every political 
power. Indeed, such contribution referring mostly to the modern 
authoritarian/totalitarian states in the Middle East and North Africa 
which have been used coercion or political aggression in their power 
relations.1 Moreover, it is important to distinguish legitimate and 
illegitimate political acts of aggression. The difference will be examined 
through examples of acts of aggression in politics, carried out especially 
from top-down approach. 
Aggression: The Physiological Approach and its 
Critiques
The task of explaining acts of aggression is a complicated one, due 
to the variety of subjects in which it is relevant. This subject-variety 
allows different branches of science, each with a different perspective, 
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try to define the essence and the source of aggression. Historically, 
the psychologist and sociologist have taken up this task, based on 
the extensive sociological experimental studies [3]. The resulting 
psychological definitions of aggression mostly focus around personal 
behavior and emotions [4]. The renowned psychologist, John Dollard, 
established a famous definition of aggression, in which he recognized 
it as any ‘sequence of behavior, the goal-response to which is the injury 
of the person toward whom it is directed’. Leonard Berkowitz used 
this definition is in his classic work, Aggression: A Social Psychological 
Analysis [5,6]. From this perspective, which concentrates on the link 
between individual behavior and aggressive attitudes, some hypotheses 
are particularly notable, including Dollard’s ‘Frustration-Aggression-
Hypothesis’ [7]. Dollard, along with Neal Miller, emphasized that “the 
occurrence of aggression always presupposes the existence of frustration 
and, contrariwise, that the existence of frustration always leads to some 
form of aggression” [7]. They determined that the generator of acts 
of aggression or aggressive behavior is in the link between a sense of 
frustration in the personal-social context and aggressive attitudes. The 
relationship between frustration and aggressive behavior, according to 
these scholars, is strong. If mere frustration, is not as strong as it can 
deprive individuals [8], then it can either cause of solitary of them or 
make them to do an act of (psychological) aggression [9,10]. 
However, there are some points of criticism that must be 
mentioned. On the one hand, the psychological approach, especially in 
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the context of family, where dedication, devotion, and sacrifice (rather 
than the mere concept of law) is the foundation of relationships, by 
no means does frustration logically demand aggression. Furthermore, 
in the social context, this argument implies a linear path of action 
in every case, in which frustration is always followed by a certain 
psychological aggression. This is a point of weakness in the theory, 
because it supposes a high level of certainty about the role and effect 
of the law in both sides of a power relation. In other words, it shapes 
expectations and predictions about the aggressor. Yet social, national, or 
international frustration does not always result in aggressive attitudes 
[11]. Considering the case of religious discrimination against women 
[12-15], which currently exists in the context of theocratic power 
structures and most tribal behavior, provides us with an unexpected 
example of how highly frustrated citizens, in this case, women, who 
are also believers, do not revolt [16,17]. This added dimension to the 
theory of Credenda [18], which explains how authorities justify the 
oppressive power relation with help of the role of belief in the power 
structures to effect the awareness of folks. The theory of Credenda 
explains the maximum capacity of the will of an authority that can be 
appeared to be justified, yet it is illegitimate act of aggression (ILAA). 
Bridging from individual concept of aggression to the social one, some 
have argued that an act of revolt and violence against the government 
is the only mean to initiate political change and progress [19,20]. Yet, 
‘change’ can be defined as an on-going revolt throughout time, instead 
of always implying the abstract, radical meaning associated with the 
aforementioned theory. It is based on this view, that conventional reason 
regards frustration as an effective element needed for change and that 
naturally causes aggression, which is always toward others [21]. In other 
words, they believe that frustration is the engine of (social) movements. 
The strongest critic on the frustration as an origin of political aggression 
is the communal ground of aggressive act. “The road to totalitarian 
domination lead through many intermediate stages for which we can 
find numerous analogies and precedents. The extraordinary bloody 
terror during the initial stage of totalitarian rule serves indeed the 
exclusive purpose of defeating the opponent and rendering all further 
opposite impossible”1. such justification does not stop at this level. Major 
terror of the authoritative and totalitarian regimes will be “launched 
after initial state has been overcome”2. The major and main terror is to 
shape the negative political consciousness of the folks to act in concrete, 
to act in accordance to the will of authoritarian/totalitarian states. The 
real terror is in the sphere of the miranda and credenda of power.
In this way, there is a fine diverge line between the psychological 
ground of aggression and political ground of aggression. What is not 
considered in the psychological definition of aggression is the origin and 
incentives of aggression from the rational point of view that can mostly 
found in the political realm. Initially, from the psychological point of 
view, frustration is inclined to one acts in revolt against herself. The 
nature of frustration is to feel upset and to be annoyed about something 
or someone, if not utterly hopeless, regarding the expectation and the 
relationship of expectation which is compared to one’s abilities and 
power to affect it. This expectation is more personal rather than social. 
Such sort of frustration may or may not lead to aggression. Yet, the 
empirical evidence of massive political aggression, especially the acrid 
ones such as Reichstag Fire Decree in 1933[22] for the imprisonment 
of anyone considered to be opponents of the Nazis, Nazi’s seizure of 
power and burst the illegitimate wars, or recently the oppression of the 
autocracies for imprisonment of journalist and political opponents2 are 
among a long list that are excluded from the definition of psychological 
1Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: A Harvest Book 1979), p.440; 
Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), p.567.
2Arendt, The Origin of Totalitarianism, (New York: Schocken Books, 1948), p.567.
aggression and the origins that it refers to, the Frustration-Aggression-
Hypothesis. Therefore, a different approach must be taken to explain 
the origins, rather than frustration, that lead to the political acts of 
aggression, legitimate and illegitimate ones. To understand aggression 
from a political point of view, this theory invites us to take one step 
further, boycott the psychological approach, to find a new way to define 
it. Here, it is appropriate to give the readers a short but vital concept 
of this article: from now on, this article is center around the idea that 
any notion in politics, here acts of aggression, can be evaluated. The 
core essence of this evaluation is to understand that any political 
phenomenon is the result of a one kind of combination between the two 
concepts of ‘rights’ and ‘power’. Moreover, the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of it is highly connected to what it has been proposed as ‘political 
consciousness theory’, which its main trait is centered around rational-
normative principles [2,23-25].
Political Consciousness Theory and the Concept of 
Legitimacy
To know about the political aggression, thus, we have to know first 
that which system or person can utilize it. Political power is all around 
us, visible and invisible, manifest in the everyday social relations, in 
people’ ideologies and their actions [26]. Power is the key concept 
of understanding politics, political lives, organizations and political 
phenomenon and their main traits such as legitimacy [27]. The core 
essence of a society stands on and for this concept. Moreover, disciplines 
in sociology, psychology, philosophy, economics and politics in one way 
or another are related to this concept. Different definitions of political 
power are crucial and determining factor for each political order, since 
it puts an agenda through which the power would be formed and 
exercised. The identification of power may be based on a single aspect. 
following such method, some scholars have presented political power 
as identified with its exercise [28], domination [29], subject dispositions 
[30,31], freedom [32] or empowerment [33]. Despite a long history of 
discussions, arguments, wars and compromises on the different notions 
of political power, theoretically and pragmatically, never these challenges 
cause a shift from the single concept to the concept of polygon of political 
power. Emphasis on the single concept of political power led to the lack 
of unanimity in saying that which definition is adequate, justified and 
legitimate. Scholars, based on such differentiated approaches, have been 
arguing that the power constitutes an ‘essentially contested’ concept 
[34]. So, the question follows with a very important consequence: does 
the concept of political power, just like democracy and legitimacy, carry 
the evaluative referent or calculative referent? Perhaps such question 
refers to the technique to analyze on the single scale scientific approach, 
and perhaps scholars belong to each side declare that the concept of 
political power falls within their field. They are partially right, but 
not absolutely. If political power, as well as democracy, human rights 
and legitimacy, are merely evaluative concepts and only fall into the 
normative evaluation of political sphere, or on the other side, if these 
concepts are merely calculative and fall into the empirical calculation 
of political sphere, how do we practice critique when there is no 
connection? And how we know what is political aggression, whether it 
is justified or should be prevented? following the evolutionary process 
of historical consciousness [35]3 thus, there must be an incentive to 
welcome the interrelationship between these intensive and extensive, 
particular and universal, factors to analyze such concepts. It may appear 
that the innovation to theorize the problem and critique of ‘singular 
essence of power’ was a move in the right direction [36,37]. Yet, such 
problematized critique focuses on the theorists rather than the concept, 
3See also speech in the City Hall of Reims on 30. March.1960 in Neuen Zürcher 
Zeitung, 31.March. 1960, Nr.90, p.2. http://www. zeitungsarchiv.nzz.ch 
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saying that essentially contested concepts are carrying the intention of 
the scholars, not that they in themselves essentially definable. They can 
be defined as the user of the concepts wishes to. For example, when an 
Islamists use the concept of legitimacy or human rights, her view of 
such concepts entailing a clear religious definition of power structure. 
A socialist has a different view of democracy which emphasizes on 
every aspect of social life, while a liberal’s definition of democracy 
is circumscribed in a scoop which emphasizes a strict distinction of 
public and private sphere [38]. However, such relativity is actually a 
consequence of sulk between the normative evaluation of the concepts 
and empirical evaluation of the concepts, which both otherwise are 
rooted in the historical consciousness, causes that scholars implying 
that there could be no agreement on single concept that defines political 
power, hence agree to not agree [38]. 
Pragmatic sphere makes the concept of political power a bit clearer, 
yet still it is far from the taken-for-granted-things. Different societies 
have been experiencing different forms of political powers as the 
authorities and sovereigns. Nevertheless, different concepts of political 
power are the products of the capacity of the people in each region and 
their unique experience of life and civilization through a long historical-
political process [39], which are in turn has been influenced by and on 
the power relations. An important thing to notice here, is that the main 
reason for existence of different forms of political powers and different 
power relations is interdependency of the concepts of political ‘power’ 
and political ‘rights’. This approach can explain, from both normative 
and empirical evaluation, why the different forms of power relation 
can carry different definitions of what assumed as essentially contested 
concepts. In other words, political power in general, and other concepts 
such as legitimacy, are characterized by a systematic recognition and 
observance of rights. Surly, possession of rights, the concept of ‘power 
to’, makes claiming possible, yet the “moral significance” of rights 
depend on the possibility of claiming them [40,41]. This is the new 
concept which can be called the concept of ‘power of ’. It implies on 
the actor’s will and intuition for act as autonomously as possible with 
relying on the two other concepts.
 The unfortunate effect of the separation of ‘power’ and ‘rights’ would 
be political disasters throughout the times when a quasi Rechtsstaat or 
in contrast a Machtstaat produces a concept of totalitarianism, using 
the extensive authority merely based on aggression [18,42]. On the 
contrary, the only remedy for such asymmetric power relations is the 
presence of the reciprocal constitutive concept of power and rights. 
The combination of political power and rights is a major ground for 
a cognitive, pragmatic and progressive legitimate power [43]. It is 
not a concept which based only on the historical claim of legitimate 
power that comes to mean for certain folks, but which the concept of 
universality is comprehensible [43]. Dolf Sternberger claims “legitimacy 
is the foundation of such governmental power as is exercised both with 
a consciousness on the government’s part that it has a right to govern 
and with some recognition by the governed of that right” [35]. This 
combination embraces all concepts of political power in a form of 
‘essentially not contested concepts’, a reciprocal constitutive of political 
power. It is, in other words, the effects of a developing capacity or 
ability in a power relation which is based on the rational and historical 
intended wills. Such phenomenon can be called as ‘consciousness of 
rights’ or ‘political consciousness’, which engage with both sides of the 
government and the governed [35]. In this work, author will use these 
two expressions as a mutual recognition, observation, justification and 
appreciation of rights that belong to the nature of democratic governments; 
in which the concept of mutual knowledge supports a healthy reciprocal 
constitutive character of political power and rights [44]4 
Illegitimate and Legitimate Aggression: The Case of 
Oppression, ILAA
Coercion or aggression is the capacity of political power to dictate 
its maximum will. Thus, the use of such an instrument highly depends 
on the unique form of political structure and the origin of the act, its 
incentive, the core essence of its emergence. Let us start with the origin 
of an act of aggression. On the one hand, as we have gone through, are 
the most common ones, frustration, and on the other hand, is logical 
disappointment. Where as disappointment is embedded in rational 
ground, frustration is embedded in emotional ground. The logic 
behind the disappointment is for the sake of making a correction or 
change, frustration on the contrary, are psychological grounded rather 
than logically. Rational-normative principles and moral significance 
are against violation, yet the psychological ground ends in violation. 
Here, we have to ask what makes the disappointment and the sense of 
correction rational and demanded, where violence, as a psychological 
related trait, is acrid and irrational? [25]. This question opens a window 
to a wider one: how we can determine any rational act in the realm of 
politics as the first step for evaluating of its legitimacy? As we already 
put it, on the one hand, the reciprocal constitutive character of the right 
and power, and on the other hand, the theory of political consciousness, 
are the cornerstone of political power and its utilized instruments. 
Therefore, the logically demanded element that has been failed to 
address yet is the rational-normative principles. Rational-normative 
principles5, the principles that are free from the admiration and belief 
and embedded in moral significance, are the source of justification in 
a power relations, namely for acts of aggression [45]. First, it helps to 
assess what the two main concepts of ‘power’ and ‘right’ really are, the 
formation of the concept of ‘power over’ and ‘power to’. Second, it helps 
to understand which power relation or specific act in a power relation 
is grounded on the justifiable principle. Justification of this sort is an 
assessment to the input legitimacy of the acts of political aggression and 
assess their accountability and effectiveness [24]. Thus, whenever we 
refer to the psychological origin of an act of aggression [7,9,19], we are 
referring to the principles that are indeed do not have the same ground 
as the rational-normative principles have. For instance, frustration is 
rooted in the feeling, it is evaluative element in the psychology rather 
than politics. Psychological origins can be regarded as a cause that can 
help us to recognize illegitimacy of an act of aggression, since they are 
contradictory with norms and moral significance of rights, and divorced 
from the rational-normative principles. This evaluation can start from 
personal behavior and extend to the communal act of aggression. A 
nation requires two reasons to be subjected to an illegitimate act 
of aggression or make an illegitimate power relation: (i) a deficit in 
political consciousness and (ii) psychological grounds for making an 
illegitimate act or an illegitimate power relation.
Getting back to the initial origins of coercion or the act of 
aggression, the rule of law, would be the most interesting subject and a 
vital instrument for any authority. To assess the essence and the origin 
4The political consciousness theory explains the capacity of legitimation of power 
structure based on rational normative principle. in this sense, Berger and Lock-
mann argue that “Legitimation ‘explains’ the institutional order by ascribing cogni-
tive validity to its objectivated meaning.” and “Knowledge proceed values in the 
legitimation of institutions.” See Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction 
of Reality; a Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge. (England: Penguin Group, 
1966), p.111.
5United Nation, “Human Rights”, Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/
Documents/60UDHR/bookleten.pdf
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of law we can rely on the firm evaluation which is presented by the 
rational-normative principles and moral significance. Such evaluation 
is admirable for an emotionless approach to see whether coercion 
is moral and legitimate [46] or illegitimate. In this sense, we can see 
that frustration, which supposedly is derived from inability, is neither 
the origin for the coercion that an authority implies nor the cause 
communal aggression nor cause illegitimate power relation. Political 
aggression, on the contrary, may stem from illegitimate but logically 
demanded immunity, preservation, and expansion of ‘power over’, or 
legitimate logically demanded correction and securing the political 
consciousness. Here, once again it has been clear that to answer this 
paper’s inquiry about political aggression, it is required to discuss the 
origins of coercion or political aggression based on rational ground, 
rather than focusing on the psychological explanation, the theory of 
Frustration-Aggression-Hypothesis. Here, we have to ask what is the 
origin of the political aggression, if aggression or coercion, for instance 
violation of human right, is not legitimate?
Pragmatically, it has always been before our eyes that “the belief in a 
state’s legitimacy is crucial – a state that was legitimate but not believed 
to be so would be no more effective than an illegitimate one thought to 
be legitimate (it might even be less effective)” [47], hence, we shall ask 
what can we offer more than such one-dimensional approach?
 Legitimacy can be divided into three dimensions of input, output 
and throughput. Input legitimacy may explain the question of What is 
the origin of legitimacy?, and based on its origin, Is it good or bad?. It is, 
in other words, referring to the questions regarding its sources. In this 
sense, only with a rational-normative argumentation one can refer to the 
concept of empowerment, respectively the concept of ‘power to’, which 
is in the center of evaluation. Following such path, the other questions 
may be in concern, such as Who make the claim to legitimacy? what 
are the sources of legitimacy?. The output legitimacy referring to the 
outcome of a power relation, the outcome of the concepts of ‘power’ 
and ‘rights’. And throughput legitimacy referring to the question 
regarding the implementation, the question of power relation, the 
question of the instruments of power, every-day life experience of states 
and its subjects, and the question about exercise of power. Hitherto, the 
scopes and dimensions of justification and legitimacy are divided and 
ordered, it may be a good try if we want to redefine them. Legitimacy 
of an authority or an act, as it is implied hereafter in this work, is the 
complex moral and rational rights, a combination of ‘power to’, ‘power 
over’, and ‘power of ’, which is manifested in the three grounds of input, 
output and throughput observation of interactions based on a high 
regarded ‘political consciousness’. Legitimacy allows the authority the 
‘right’ “to be the exclusive imposer of binding duties” [48] and rights, 
to be the exclusive imposer of coercion, e.g. sanction and punishment 
or better to say act of aggression, to observe the duties and to recognize 
and safeguard the rights of its subjects, and to constantly maintain its 
justification through which the authority and subject would comply 
through their duties, recognize the rational and mutually constitutive 
concept of power, and to maintain the political stabilities. Thus, 
justification is about alternatives or power and belief of the subject, 
while legitimacy, although it composes all concepts of justification, it 
is about individual and political ‘rights’ [48], mutual recognition and 
observation of it, and the scope of its entitlement and empowerment 
[49,50]. In this sense, belief in state’s or power’s legitimacy and belief in 
its justification almost coexistence. The instrument that political power 
utilizes to whirl its authority is more related to the justification of its 
constituent form, its sovereignty, than of its legitimacy. As legitimacy 
and justification are divided to three sphere of input, throughput, 
and output legitimacy; the throughput dimension is the highest point 
where the justification and legitimacy work together. The throughput 
legitimacy, moreover, is the major scoop where coercion or act of 
aggression will be evaluated. Moral justification and moral legitimacy, 
for instance, are the different approach to the input dimension, where 
as legal justification and legal legitimacy is the different approach to the 
throughput dimension. 
The genuine difference between diverse acts of aggression is not 
only its intensity of it but depends on their legitimacy and illegitimacy. 
Specifically, the difference between violation of human right and a 
corrective law depends on two point: In general, whether the state and 
in particular whether a power relation or a law is justified and legitimate 
respectively. Thus, in the particular cases, the question is to what extent 
the law or any sort of act of aggression and coercion is contained the 
rational-normative principles and moral significance, to what extent it is 
relying on the concept of ‘power over’ and power to’, or on the contrary, 
whether to what extend contained the concept of ‘usurpation’ [43]. 
Moreover, to what extend such power relation or law are established 
the political consciousness. Furthermore, conventional reason may be 
assumed that an act of violation, namely violation of the political rights 
of governed, is the one and the only coercive instrument for an authority 
[51,52]. However, state’s coercion cannot be reduced to the illegitimate 
one, namely an act of violation. A power relation or a law does not 
naturally carry the element of legitimacy just because it is imposed by 
an authority. authorities are inevitably use coercion to practice their 
sovereignty, namely law. Such practice has been always taken place in 
the path of interaction in which it contains two side of the governor 
and those whom governed. Such path shows the connection of concept 
of ‘power over’, ‘power to’, and ‘power of ’ in the power relation. Hereto, 
‘rational-normative principles’ and moral significance are what must be 
considered when assessing whether an act is balanced between these 
concept, hence legitimate or an act does not carry such balance, oppress 
the process of politicization by aborting the political consciousness, 
hence illegitimate. For instance, the illegitimacy of a violation, as one 
form among a long list of illegitimate acts of aggression which may 
self-justified by the authority and relying merely on the concept of 
‘power over’, yet cannot justified by the subject, fail to appreciate the 
concept of ‘power to’ and ‘power of ’- which entails the concept of moral 
significance and relying on the entitlement to claim to a right- as the 
other vital sides of a power relation. Such illegitimate act, looking in 
depth, is a thrive for the existence of the authority, hanging up on the 
self-justified act itself. Moreover, violation of human right is among the 
illegitimate act of aggression and repetition of ILAA, which is taken 
place in the path of history, inevitably causes a structural oppression. 
On the other hand, coercion can be legitimate only if it is based on 
rational-normative grounds and moral significance. It is implemented 
not only by the mere notion of power of law, logically respected under 
the principle of political consciousness, but a positive sense of morality 
in it. Hence, we can clearly see, that the rational-normative principles 
and moral significance are the ground for legitimacy of an act or any 
political power. 
Political Anxiety and Acts of Aggression
Political powers utilize coercion to establish or to preserve one or 
all of the concept of powers [38]. In a power relation, for those who 
are exercising power and for those who are subjected to it, there is a 
level of anxiety. The reason is not the reciprocal relation between the 
concepts of ‘power over’, ‘power to’, and ‘power of ’, but the potential 
tension between the concept of ‘power over’, i.e. domination, and the 
two other concept. The concepts of power in any power relation vitally 
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depends on one another to be justified. Lack of one of the concepts 
disturbing the balance that requires for legitimacy, is accompanied by 
the overwhelming concept of domination over other or vice versa. This 
brings the anxiety for those who are in one or both side of a power 
relation. For instance, if in a power relation, the concept of ‘power to’ 
is ignored or oppressed, for any possible reason, the level of anxiety 
for those who are in possession of ‘power over’, is high. This would be 
because of the reason that the concept of ‘power over’, the domination 
of an authority, is already self-justified without the concept of ‘power to’ 
and anxiety is for the preservation of their continuity in domination. The 
existing concept of ‘power to’, which is solely justified, would be hardly 
challenged if it counters with the questions based on other concepts 
of power. Thus, an authority which merely relying on the concept of 
‘power over’ for its preservation try to suppresses the elements that 
helps the process of politicization and flourishing the concept of 
‘power to’ and ‘power of ’, try to suppress any notion of empowerment 
and right that can be found in governed, namely aborting the political 
consciousness. On the other hand, if in a power relation the concept 
of ‘power over’ is ignored, for any possible reason, the level of anxiety 
in both sides of power relation is high. This would be because of the 
reason that the concept of ‘power to’ does not recognize the concept 
of ‘power over’. Disaffection is one reason among a long list of others 
for the social movements and revolution. Moreover, it results in a high 
level of anxiety for both side of a power relation in which an authority 
would obtain its existence and its domination merely with relying on 
its self-justified ‘power over’. In contrast, the politicized folks already 
recognized their political rights, relying on the concept of ‘power to’, do 
not give their consent to the authority. This would be an introduction 
for better understanding of political anxiety. Thus, this level of anxiety 
fluctuates depending on the different power relations. In particular acts, 
whereas legitimate act of aggression, as an instrument of law, results in a 
minimum sense of anxiety, illegitimate act of aggression usually results 
in the maximum level of anxiety for both sides of a power relations, 
especially for the authority. Such approach to the political anxiety can 
illustrate that how often the bleeding hearts have an ironic fear of their 
own blood. Furthermore, political anxiety would cheerfully address 
the origins of illegitimate act of aggression, including violation of 
human rights and oppression, which belongs to the complex study of 
behavioral politics [53]. 
The Ratio of Political Anxiety 
Political anxiety is always accompanied by fear of dangers to the 
preservation of one or more concept of power and rights. We see this through 
the endeavors of authoritarian/totalitarian governments, such as in North 
Korea, Syria, Tunisia and many more authorities that have been showing 
anxiety, and consequently conducting illegitimate act of aggression. One might 
ask, how is political power trapped within a condition of political anxiety? Why 
does it include a sense of fear of preservation? Not repeating what has been gone 
throw, the origin of political anxiety is inevitable of what we understand as the 
nature of political power. Political anxiety is present, but amount of it depends 
on the ratio between the concepts of power. A high level of political anxiety is 
due to its own illegitimacy, since the core indigence of de facto political power 
is political consciousness. In other words, there would be no political power, 
in the real sense, unless there was more or less political consciousness within a 
power structure. Political consciousness is one of the most important elements 
for the justification and legitimacy of power. In authoritarian/totalitarian power 
structures, there have been always different form of rivalries between the 
authority and the citizens, between the different concepts of power. The main 
reason for this, is that a high level of political consciousness, the knowledge of 
the reciprocal constitutive concepts of power and rights to shape a legitimate 
power relation, reveals the wanton brutality, hypocrisy and deceit and 
threatened the very nature of such regimes. Political consciousness has 
“driven many fine sprites into life-long rebellion” [21] and brutal attempt 
of authorities to preserve their domination, as consequence, and they 
result in the highest level of anxiety throughout a power relation. Based 
on the argument so far, theoretically, if we assume that the folks already 
recognized their rights, the concept of ‘power to’ and ‘power of ’, then we 
can say that the ratio between the level of political anxiety and the level 
of political consciousness in authoritarian/totalitarian regimes would 
be equal, whereas the ratio between the level of political anxiety and the 
level of political consciousness in democratic regimes is the opposite. 
That is to say, a high level of political consciousness in authoritarian/
totalitarian regimes instigates a high level of anxiety, whereas the high 
level of political consciousness in democratic regimes causes a low level 
of political anxiety for the authority [1,53-55]6. 
Anxiety-Aggression-Hypothesis
What kinds of power produces anxiety as a logical function of 
their nature? As argued, theoretically, there has always been political 
consciousness in power structures. From a top-down approach, and 
where a political power is conscious of its illegitimacy, one-dimension 
concept of ‘power over’ has been the primordial of political power [56-
60]. Simultaneously, it produces a high level of anxiety for the sake of its 
preservation in itself, since its existence lacks a critical element for its 
preservation: legitimacy. Moreover, it produces a high level of anxiety 
among its subject since it uses violation and oppression, the illegitimate 
acts of aggression [61-70]. A complete report of Human Watch in 2015 
indicates that almost all of the theocratic and communist regimes also 
have totalitarian power structures. In this sense the level of violation 
of human right is high. This means that the main instrument for these 
authorities is the illegitimate act of aggression. This can be attributed 
to the fact that the concept of ‘power over’ and ignorance of the 
connections between the concepts of power and rights in their power 
structures provides a ground for illegitimate acts of aggression, to 
violate the human rights and oppress their folks. This pragmatic study 
is among a long list of others that supports the theoretical presumption, 
here, that high levels of political consciousness, which promote the 
concept of ‘power to’ and moral significance that backs up the claim to 
these rights, the concept of ‘power of ’, on the one hand, is embedded 
6See also Kim Parker, “Where the Public Stands on Government Assistance, Tax-
es and the Presidential Candidates,” Pew Research Center, Sep.2012, www.pew-
socialtrends.org/2012/09/20/where-the-public-stands-on-government-assistance-
taxes-and-the-presidential-candidates/ (accessed Augest 2015)
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in the rational normative principles, and on the other hand, threatened 
the existence of authoritarian/totalitarian regimes [71-80] (Figure 1).®7
To conclude this part of the contribution, the origin of violation of 
human rights and oppression, i.e., the illegitimate act of aggression, is 
political anxiety, since illegitimacy causes depreciation or deprivation 
of political power. More specifically, in most cases, the illegitimacy 
of a political power produces a high level of political anxiety that 
consequently is one of the fundamental reasons for the use of oppression 
by governing actors directed at the governed, because without acts 
of oppression, illegitimate political powers do not have any other 
instruments for their political preservation. “Frustration-Aggression-
Hypothesis” is not yet addressed such political phenomenon. Hence, 
it is better to call this new political-oriented aspect, an “Anxiety-
Aggression-Hypothesis” [81-90].
Concluding Remarks
This contribution can be divided into three main parts. The first 
part, argues that the psychological approach which predominantly 
uses the Frustration-Aggression-Hypothesis explains aggression, yet 
does not address the political acts of aggression. To begin with, the 
contribution commenced with theorizing some fundamental concepts, 
such as political consciousness [91-100]. This, basically, relies on the 
presumption that the concept of political power and political rights 
have been the vital elements of any political phenomenon, including 
coercion. The second point that has shown the importance of political 
consciousness is its nature. It is the main trait that a legitimate power 
relation or an act can be defined with. The third point is the nature 
of legitimacy, which as it has been argued, is the rational-normative 
principles. These two helped to argue that an act of aggression is 
legitimate or illegitimate. To mention some instance, violation of human 
rights and oppression is argued as the illegitimate acts of aggression.
The genealogy of acts of political aggression leads the argument to 
a newly-proposed category in aggression theory in politics: Anxiety-
Aggression-Hypothesis. On the contrary to the Frustration-Aggression-
Hypothesis, Anxiety-Aggression-Hypothesis focuses more on the 
relationship between political power and political-consciousness. The 
argument focus on the explanatory approach, arguing that the level of 
anxiety depends on two factor: one is the nature of power relation, and the 
other, is the level of political consciousness which is directly connected 
to the first factor. The core essence of this contribution which connects 
all the argued section together relies on the reciprocal relationship 
between political power, political consciousness, and political anxiety 
that affect any power relation. Focusing on the coercion, legitimacy of 
coercion or any specific act of aggression in a power relation is relying 
on the political consciousness and rational normative principles. 
Furthermore, political consciousness effects differently in different 
power relation. Political consciousness is admired in democratic 
regimes since the nature of power is the reciprocal concepts of power, 
appreciate the three concept of ‘power over’, ‘power to’, and ‘power of ’. 
This consequent assesses the three dimensions of the regime. On the 
contrary, the nature of authority which is relying on the one concept 
of power: ‘power over’, ignores the political consciousness [101-113]. 
This means that the concept of political consciousness which produces, 
promotes, and backs up the two other concepts of power, is reputed and 
tried to be ignored. The high level of political consciousness in such 
regime produce a high level of anxiety. Considering this theory in a 
7Human Rights Watch, (2015). (United Nation) Report, 2015. http://www.hrw.org/
world-report/2015http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2015
different aspect, the level of political anxiety can be one of the main 
reason for illegitimate political aggression. Putting this theory into 
practice, one can see the connection between the level of violation of 
human right or oppression and the legitimacy of regimes.
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